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ABSTRACT
Strategic monitoring of recognition memory by children and adults was examined using a
semantic DRM procedure. Children (7- and 10-year-olds) and adults (overall N = 393) studied
lists of semantically related words either incidentally or intentionally and were tested with
old items, new items and critical lures to judge as old or new. Participants either made a
decision about every item they saw (forced report), or they had the opportunity to withhold
answers they were uncertain about (free report). Children were less likely to withhold an
answer than adults. However, 7-year-olds were more able to resist false memories when
given the opportunity to withhold an answer compared to 10-year-olds or adults. In
contrast, adults were unable to improve false memory accuracy. These data suggest that
once semantically induced false memories have been encoded they are amenable to
strategic monitoring at retrieval in children but not adults.
ARTICLE HISTORY
Received 10 March 2020






Remembering well can be assessed by measuring how
much is remembered (quantity), or by looking at the pro-
portion of output that is correct (accuracy). These two
measures often dissociate. For instance, developmental
research shows a clear memory quantity increase with
age (Ghetti & Lee, 2011), but a mixed pattern for
memory accuracy (Brainerd et al., 2008; Koriat et al.,
2001; Krebs & Roebers, 2010) and even evidence of a
developmental decline in memory accuracy for semanti-
cally related non-presented information (“critical lures” in
so-called Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) materials).
That is, although adults and older children (10-year-olds)
remember more than younger children (7- and 5-year-
olds), they are also more susceptible to false memories
(Brainerd et al., 2008).
Central to the understanding of memory accuracy is
the concept of memory control. In order to increase
memory accuracy, it is necessary to excise control
over memory decisions about what to report, or how
to report it (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996). There is good
evidence that adults and children older than 6 years
can strategically control their memory accuracy by with-
holding information when unsure, across a range of
memory settings (Hollins & Weber, 2017; Koriat et al.,
2001; Koriat & Goldsmith, 1994; Krebs & Roebers,
2010; Perfect & Weber, 2012; Roebers et al., 2009).
However, developmental change in memory control
for DRM lists has yet to be studied and so this is an
aim of the present work.
The DRM paradigm (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDer-
mott, 1995) involves the study of semantically associated
word lists (e.g., hot, snow, warm, winter, ice, etc) that
relate to a non-presented item (i.e., cold, the critical lure).
As well as correctly recalling or recognising items from
the studied lists (presented items, e.g., hot), participants
also frequently falsely remember unpresented information
such as the critical lure (e.g., cold). Participants remember
less frequently unpresented information that is semanti-
cally related items relating to the individual list (e.g.,
water) than in turn unpresented semantically unrelated
items (e.g., beautiful) (Brainerd et al., 2008; Brainerd &
Reyna, 2005; Gallo, 2010; Howe et al., 2009; Roediger
et al., 2001). That is, false memories for critical lures are
not a result of a generalised memory deficit but are
specific to the semantic association between the critical
lure and the presented information. These false memories
for critical lures increase from the age of 5 to adulthood
(Dewhurst & Robinson, 2004; Howe et al., 2009; Otgaar
et al., 2014). An overall false memories increase from the
age of 5 onward may appear counterintuitive, but is com-
patible with theories of memory development that posit
increasing gist extraction abilities through childhood
(Fuzzy-Trace-Theory, Brainerd & Reyna, 2005) or greater
associative activation (Associative-Activation-Theory,
Howe et al., 2009). That is, Associative-Activation theory
suggests that a single process of association formation in
a semantic network via spreading activation between
nodes and concepts accounts for true and false memories.
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Children’s false memories for critical lures increase with
age because association formation becomes more
refined and automatic with increasing age (Howe et al.,
2009). In contrast, Fuzzy-Trace-Theory posits memories
are formed via a verbatim memory trace processing
surface features of presented information and a gist
trace processing the overall semantic meaning (Brainerd
& Reyna, 2005). False memories underlie gist extraction
abilities which increase with increasing age (Brainerd
et al., 2008). Therefore, in the DRM paradigm, false mem-
ories for critical lures increase with increasing age.
A large body of literature has manipulated the study of
DRM lists to increase monitoring of the studied material
eliminating or attenuating the effect of age increase for
critical lures. For instance, when information gives rise to
distinctive or verbatim processing, retrieval monitoring
strategies such as “recall-to reject” can be employed by
older children and adults to avoid errors but there is
debate of underlying metacognitive strategy versus auto-
matic retrieval process (Brainerd et al., 2003; Carneiro
et al., 2009; Roediger et al., 2001). Forewarning about the
false memory effect, having an easily identifiable
common theme, presenting distinctive pictures, and
repeating lists during encoding have reduced false mem-
ories in older children and adults but not in younger chil-
dren (e.g., Brainerd & Reyna, 2005; Carneiro et al., 2009; Del
Prete et al., 2014; Ghetti, 2003; 2008; Tempel et al., 2015).
However, these manipulations are implemented at encod-
ing and mostly of implicit nature. It remains unclear
whether these manipulations have increased gist extrac-
tion in younger children (e.g., Lampinen et al., 2006;
Odegard et al., 2008) or activation of association with the
critical lure (De Petro et al., 2014) in addition to memory
editing versus automatic retrieval (Brainerd & Reyna,
2005; Ghetti, 2003) to avoid errors at retrieval. Conse-
quently, in the current work, we adopt an explicit monitor-
ing manipulation that only applies to the retrieval phase.
Explicit retrieval manipulations such as directed forget-
ting (“forget the just studied list”) reveals that children are
able to reduce the occurrence of false memories for critical
lures whereas adults are unable to do so (Howe, 2005;
Kimball & Bjork, 2002; Knott et al., 2011). Specifically, fol-
lowing a standard DRM study episode, Kimball and Bjork
(2002) found that false memories for critical lures were
unaffected by the instruction to recall, or forget, the pre-
vious list, indicating lack of retrieval monitoring at
output. In children, on the other hand, directed forgetting
reduces false recall (Howe, 2005; Knott et al., 2011),
suggesting they may be able to distinguish true from
false memories at retrieval.
However, drawing firm conclusions about retrieval
monitoring from this work is difficult for the following
reason. The effects of directed forgetting may not uniquely
reflect output monitoring. Previous work has argued that
list-based directed forgetting effects may reflect shifts in
mental context (e.g., Sahakyan & Kelley, 2002) or inhibition
(e.g., Bjork, 1989). Therefore, in the present work, we use
withholding individual responses as a more direct
measure of the ability to monitor and control memory
for specific items not yet researched to date.
Explicit retrieval instructions to withhold answers to
individual items when uncertain can increase children’s
memory accuracy in non-misleading contexts such as
remembering a particular event rather than semantically
related information (Koriat et al., 2001; Krebs & Roebers,
2010; Roebers et al., 2009). Specifically, 7- and, particularly,
11-year-olds’ output accuracy was higher when they were
free to withhold answers about a previously presented
story ( free-report), relative to the case when an answer is
required ( forced-report: Koriat et al., 2001). Likewise, 8–
12-year-olds can increase their accuracy by withholding
difficult test answers they feel uncertain about, (Krebs &
Roebers, 2010; Roebers et al., 2009). Additionally, children
aged 6 and above show higher accuracy for the items they
would want their memory to be judged on (“golden
items”) (Hembacher & Ghetti, 2013). Thus, children from
at least 6 years onwards can explicitly use monitoring strat-
egies at retrieval to increase their memory accuracy in
many different contexts. However, it remains unclear
whether or not this extends to semantically induce false
memories for critical lures in the DRM paradigm.
The specificity of the DRM procedure is that it differen-
tiates between memories for semantically presented infor-
mation (presented items, e.g., hot), semantically related
non-presented information (critical lures, cold), semanti-
cally related list items that were non-presented (related
distractors, e.g., water) and semantically unrelated infor-
mation (unrelated distractors, e.g., beautiful). Examining
the ability to improve memory accuracy through withhold-
ing a response across the different DRM item types will
differentiate between an ability to monitor memory accu-
racy per se versus an ability to monitor memory accuracy
for semantically induced false memories as in critical
lures. That is, if both children and adults have a generalised
ability to monitor memory accuracy then given the oppor-
tunity to withhold an answer should have similar effects
across all item types. In contrast, if children but not
adults distinguish true from false memories at retrieval
(Howe, 2005; Kimball & Bjork, 2002; Knott et al., 2011)
then children but not adults may be able to monitor
memory accuracy for critical lures.
The latter pattern would be predicted by developmen-
tal theories explaining occurrence of false memories for
critical lures. According to AAT (Howe et al., 2009;
Wimmer & Howe, 2009) adults should have difficulty in
monitoring false memories for critical lures compared to
children, due to automatic activation outside of conscious
control than in turn semantically related non-presented
items that do not repeatedly and directly activate the criti-
cal lure. FTT would also predict that adults should have
more difficulty to monitor false memories for critical
lures than semantically related items compared to children
because the former underlie more gist extraction pro-
cesses for false memories that increase with age and
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increasingly underlie recollective processes. As a result,
adults are not able to accurately monitor them at retrieval
(Brainerd et al., 2004; Brainerd & Reyna, 2005).
Additional empirical reason to suspect that adults may
not be able to monitor false memories for critical lures at
retrieval is that encoding manipulations of processing
levels have little effect on adult’s false memories as
opposed to children’s. Encoding information in standard
form (memorise everything) versus shallow form (focus
on surface features e.g., font, divided attention) does not
affect adults’ false memories for critical lures (Dodds &
MacLeod, 2004). Dividing attention during encoding
reduces children’s false memories for critical lures but
not adults’ (Otgaar, Peters, & Howe, 2012). Moreover,
under shallow processing, children’s but not adults’ false
memories are correlated with the overall amount remem-
bered (Wimmer & Howe, 2010), suggesting false memory
formation for critical lures may be automatic in adults
but not children. If so, they should be amenable to accu-
racy monitoring at retrieval in children but not adults.
Indeed, adults’ monitoring accuracy at retrieval for
memory of words and faces is unaffected by shallow pro-
cessing (Arnold & Prike, 2015). However, shallow proces-
sing reduces the willingness to report an answer when
given the opportunity to withhold them (Arnold & Prike,
2015). Thus, shallow processing affects adults’ amount of
withholding answers but not the ability to monitor accu-
racy for presented information, suggesting these pro-
cesses are dissociated. It is unclear whether these
processes are dissociated to begin with. Therefore, a sec-
ondary aim of the current research was to manipulate pro-
cessing level at encoding to investigate its effect on
accuracy monitoring at retrieval in both children and
adults.
To address this, the current research examined the
effects of retrieval monitoring strategies (skip an answer
when unsure) in the DRM paradigm. We compared chil-
dren at the age when monitoring develops (around 7
years) with both older children who are assumed to have
developed monitoring abilities (10-year-olds; Ghetti,
2003; 2008; Koriat et al., 2001), and with adults.
We also explored whether strategic output monitoring
is susceptible to level of processing manipulations
(shallow versus standard) at encoding. It is expected that
shallow processing increases adults’ willingness to report
an answer, but does not affect the accuracy of strategic
monitoring (Arnold & Prike, 2015). If the two processes
are dissociated to begin with, we should also find the
same pattern in children. That is, shallow processing
should affect response bias in terms of how much infor-
mation is volunteered without affecting the accuracy of
strategic monitoring.
Experiment
To manipulate the level of encoding, participants were
either instructed to memorise the presented information
(standard encoding) or instructed to press the colour
button the word is written in without receiving memory
instructions (shallow encoding). At retrieval, half of the
participants were given the opportunity to skip an
answer when unsure (free reporting) whereas the other
half was required to provide an answer (forced reporting).
Method
Participants
Overall 393 participants (223 females) took part: 148 (75
females) 7-year-olds (M = 7;8, SD = 8 months), 147 (72
females) 10-year-olds (M = 10;2, SD = 9 months), and 98
(76 females) adults (M = 24, SD = 11 years). Children were
recruited from local primary schools with a varied socio-
economic intake and took part following parental
consent and their own assent on the testing day. This
was a convenience sample, with sample size limited by
the number of children to take part in local schools
which had parental consent and gave their own assent
to participate in the research. Adults were recruited via a
university participation pool and were seen in the univer-
sity laboratory receiving course credit.
Design
A 3(age group: 7-year-olds vs. 10-year-olds vs. adults) × 2
(condition: standard vs. shallow processing) × 2(reporting:
forced vs. free) × 4(item type: critical lures vs. presented
items vs. related distractors vs. unrelated distractors)
design was used where all variables were manipulated
between participants apart from item type which was
the within participant variable.
Materials and procedure
Children were tested individually in a quiet area outside
their classroom and received verbal instructions from the
experimenter that were also displayed on the computer
screen. Adults were tested in groups of six, on individual
computers and followed the instructions displayed on
their screen wearing headphones. The experimental
session consisted of three phases: study, distractor, and
recognition phase.
The six, 15-item DRM lists (bread, cold, doctor, fruit, lion,
sleep) from Roediger et al. (2001) were presented visually
and orally at a 2-s rate on a computer screen, one word
at a time, and each word was written in colour (either
red, green, or blue) (see Appendix). The 15 items were pre-
sented in descending backwards associative strength (BAS
= the probability that a list item activates the critical lure)
to the critical lure. Lists were chosen according to their
high word frequency values using the word frequency
norms of British primary school aged children’s printed
vocabulary (Stuart et al., 1993–1996). After each DRM list,
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a filler picture of a star appeared for 3-s indicating the end
of one list and the beginning of the next.
Participants were randomly allocated to the standard
condition (N = 196; 72 7-year-olds, 75 10-year-olds, 49
adults) or the shallow condition (N = 197; 76 7-year-
olds, 72 10-year-olds, 49 adults). In the standard con-
dition, participants were instructed to remember as
many words as possible. In the shallow condition,
there was no intention to memorise but participants
were instructed to press the colour button on the key-
board that corresponded to the colour of the presented
item. Red, green, and blue stickers were affixed to the c,
b, m keys, respectively. Participants received six practise
items that were semantically and phonologically unre-
lated to the presented DRM lists. When participants
reached criterion, that is, all practise trials correct,
they proceeded with the DRM lists.
After all six lists have been presented, children
received a 3-min “Where’s Wally?” distractor task and
adults computed mathematical calculations. Finally,
they received a 36-item recognition test consisting of
18 presented words (the first three items from each
list that were the strongest related to the critical lure,
e.g., hot), 6 critical lures (the strongest associated non-
presented item from each list, e.g., cold), 6 related dis-
tractors (non-presented items related to presented
items, e.g., water), and 6 unrelated distractors (non-pre-
sented items not related to presented items, e.g., beau-
tiful) that were presented orally and visually in random
order. All items were presented in black font. Respond-
ing was self-paced.
Forced reporting
At the beginning of the recognition phase participants (N
= 206; 68 7-year-olds, 82 10-year-olds, 56 adults) were
instructed to say “yes” if the item was presented before
and “no” if it was a new item. For child participants, the
experimenter recorded the response whereas adults
responded themselves by pressing the “y” and “n” keys.
Free reporting
The other half of the participants (N = 187; 80 7-year-olds,
65 10-year-olds, 42 adults) were told that they were
playing a memory game where they could win one
bonus point for each correct answer made. However,
they would lose all their points for an incorrect answer
(see Koriat et al., 2001). Therefore, if they were unsure
they could “skip” the answer. If they skipped they did
not gain or lose any points, so they were told that it was
beneficial to skip when they were unsure. Before the rec-
ognition phase began, child participants were asked to
repeat the instructions. The experimenter repeated
instructions until children could correctly explain the
rules themselves. During the recognition phase, partici-
pants could either respond, “yes”, “no” or “skip” and the
experimenter pressed the corresponding button on the
keyboard for children. At the end of the experiment, all
child participants were told that they did not lose any
points and were praised for their performance. Adults
received all instructions on the screen and recorded their
responses themselves via button presses on the keyboard,
y, n, or s.
Statistical analysis
Our primary analysis estimated the effect of free (skipping)
vs. forced reporting on memory accuracy, and we mod-
elled the proportion of correct responses within each
item type using a mixed effects binomial regression. Our
model was designed to address three potential challenges
in analysing these data: First, average rates of skipping
differ between age groups. Because we are interested in
the effect of permitting skipping, rather than the rate of
skipping per se, we accounted for skipping rates in our ana-
lyses. This is important because, to take an extreme
example, if skipping is zero, then performance cannot
improve relative to forced reporting. If skipping is 100%,
then accuracy must be worse than in forced reporting.
Second, the potential benefit of free reporting (skipping)
varies according to the baseline performance of forced
reporting: if performance under forced reporting is high
then skipping has little potential to improve accuracy. As
a result, we examined whether the option to skip improves
accuracy, accounting for the baseline rate of forced report-
ing accuracy.
The model was fit with neutral, but weakly informative
priors using rstanarm (Goodrich et al., 2018). Convergence
of multiple chains was checked visually, and with reference
to the \hat{R} statistic and the number of effective samples
(Gelman & Shirley, 2011) for each parameter. Marginal
odds ratios (for the probability of a correct response) and
intervals (95% highest posterior density) for comparisons
of interest were computed based on these models
(Kruschke, 2011) using the emmeans package (Lenth,
2019). Equivalent models were used to estimate rates of
skipping between age groups, item types, and encoding
conditions within the skipping group. All data and ana-
lyses for this paper are provided in doi://10.5281/
zenodo.3369209.
Results and discussion
Eleven participants (five adults, two 10-year-olds, four 7-
year-olds) were excluded from the analyses because they
responded “yes” to all items in the recognition test.
Skipping rates
Skipping rates were substantially above zero across all
items for all age groups in both encoding conditions
(mean number skipped 7.42 [5.89–9.06]) although variabil-
ity in skipping rates between items and conditions was
evident (see Figure 1). More related distractors were
skipped than any other type (odds ratio (OR) for related
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distractors compared with the mean of other types = 1.35
[1.10–1.62]). In contrast, fewer presented items (OR = 0.81
[0.69–0.93]) and unrelated distractors (OR = 0.81 [0.64–
0.99]) were skipped.
There was also an effect of age group whereby adults
skipped more items than both 7-year-olds (OR = 3.25
[1.79–5.26]) and 10-year-olds (OR = 2.92 [1.54–4.84]). The
7- and 10-year-olds did not substantially differ (OR = 1.12
[0.63–1.74]). Additionally, more items were skipped in
the standard than shallow encoding condition (OR = 0.65
[0.39–0.95]).
Effect of reporting on accuracy
To explore the effects of skipping on accuracy, we esti-
mated the benefit of free reporting (skipping) based on
the forced choice responding baseline by age groups.
We first estimated whether the marginal benefit of free
reporting (skipping) vs. forced choice reporting was
different in the two encoding conditions (standard
versus shallow) for the different age groups, across the
different item types. This was not the case (Figure 2): The
Bayes factor in favour of the null hypothesis (no effect of
or interactions with encoding condition) was very large
(BF = 57,624). In other words, there was an equal benefit
of skipping on accuracy in the shallow and standard con-
dition, across age groups and item types. Consequently,
in our subsequent analyses, we report the results collapsed
across encoding conditions. Our data supplement pro-
vides additional plots and tables split by encoding
condition.
Figure 3(A) indicates that when participants could skip
responses then accuracy for presented items increased for
both adults and 10-year-olds. In contrast, 7-year-olds did
not experience a benefit for presented items. As can be
seen in Figure 3(B), both 10-year-olds and adults increased
in accuracy relative to 7-year-olds (OR = 1.15 [1.03–1.28]
and 1.21 [1.08–1.36]), but adults and 10-year-olds did not
differ substantially (OR = 1.05 [0.94–1.17]).
For related and unrelated distracters, all age groups
experienced greater accuracy when allowed to skip (OR
from 1.09 [1.03–1.15] to OR = 1.42 [1.22–1.67]). Adults
gained more benefit than children (OR = 1.23 [1.02–1.45]
and OR = 1.27 [1.06–1.51]), but the two groups of
children did not differ (OR = 0.96 [0.87–1.07] and OR =
0.97 [0.89–1.05])
Figure 1. Rates of skipping by age group, item type and condition with 95% confidence interval.
Figure 2. Effect of skipping on accuracy by age group, item type, and condition with 95% confidence interval.
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For critical lures, the pattern was reversed. When
allowed to skip responses both 7-year-olds (OR = 1.56
[1.34–1.79]) and 10-year-olds (OR = 1.24 [1.03–1.46])
showed increased accuracy. Adults’ accuracy did increase
somewhat, but this value was estimated with less precision
and the credible interval for the OR did not exclude zero
(OR = 1.23 [0.86–1.68]). Seven-year-olds gained greater
benefit in accuracy for critical lures than 10-year-
olds when allowed to skip items (0.80 [0.63–0.98]). A
similar trend was evident for the comparison between 7-
year-olds and adults, but again the credible interval for
this difference did not exclude zero (OR = 0.79 [0.54–
1.11]). Adults and 10-year-olds did not differ (OR = 1.00
[0.65–1.40]).
Figure 3. Effect of skipping on response accuracy, within and between age groups. Intervals are 95% highest posterior density. Panel A shows the effect of
skipping for each group as an odds ratio, so an OR of 1 means there was no effect. Panel B shows the differences in this effect for each pair of groups. Here
an OR of 1 means there is no difference in the effect. A/7 and A/10 mean adults compared with 7-year-olds or 10-year-olds.
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Discussion
Our studywas thefirst toexaminedevelopmental changes in
strategic monitoring at retrieval on accuracy in the DRM
paradigm. We found that false memories are reduced (accu-
racy for critical lures increased) in children when the option
to withhold an answer is available. This was the case for
both for 7- and 10-year-olds who have developed monitor-
ing abilities (Koriat et al., 2001). In contrast, adults were
unable to reduce their rate of false memories when given
the opportunity to skip responses. Contrary to the estab-
lished finding that withholding answers increases accuracy
for episodic memory tests (Hollins & Weber, 2017; Koriat &
Goldsmith, 1994; Perfect & Weber, 2012) adults failed to do
so in a misleading context as in the DRM paradigm. Thus,
when false memories are semantically induced adults not
only have more false memories than children (Brainerd
et al., 2008; Howe et al., 2009) but are also unable to
monitor and withhold them at output (current study). Our
current DRM findings bear similarity to a pattern found in
Koriat and Goldsmith (1996, Experiment 2), where adults
showed littlebenefit inusing free report to improve theaccu-
racy for deceptive general knowledge questions. These are
questions for which people think they know the answer
but are often wrong (such as thinking that Sydney is the
capital of Australia). Confidence is high for these types of
questions and participants do not skip when they should.
Previous work has shown, using directed forgetting
instructions, that children are able to reduce false mem-
ories when given an instruction to forget the just studied
information, but that this is not true of adults (Howe,
2005; Kimball & Bjork, 2002; Knott et al., 2011). However,
directed forgetting studies are list based (“forget all you
have just studied”) rather than item based, and it is
unclear whether list-based directed forgetting reflects
output monitoring (Kimball & Bjork, 2002; Knott et al.,
2011) or shifts in mental context (e.g., Sahakyan & Kelley,
2002) or inhibition (e.g., Bjork, 1989). In contrast, the
current results provide direct evidence for the role of
output monitoring: Children, but not adults, could
reduce rates of false memories by withholding an answer
to individual items. This finding is not a generic effect of
lack of output monitoring for non-presented information:
we found different patterns of accuracy for related and
unrelated distractors. For distractors, all participants were
able to increase their accuracy given the opportunity to
skip, but adults particularly-so. Thus, the inability of
adults to increase accuracy by withholding an answer
was unique to semantically induced false memories.
This pattern of results can be accounted for theoretically
by either AAT or FTT and does not allow distinguishing
between the two. Critical lures are directly semantically
related to the list items, whereas related distractors have
semantic similarity to the list items but are not directly
semantically related to all list items nor have list items back-
ward associate strength (probability to activate) to related
distractors (Brainerd et al., 2003; Odegard et al., 2008).
Therefore, AAT predicts critical lures not to be amenable
to retrieval monitoring as opposed to related distractors
particularly in adults whose associative activation formation
is automatic compared to children’s (Howe et al., 2009). FTT
posits that younger children are less able to extract the gist
from presented information and because related distractors
are not related to all list items nor directly activated, they do
not allow gist extraction as opposed to critical lures. As a
result, they should be easier to avoid at output (Brainerd
et al., 2004; Brainerd & Reyna, 2005; Odegard et al., 2008;
see also Lampinen et al., 2006). Support for this notion
comes from conjoint recognition paradigms, where children
and adults are either asked to recognise presented items
only (verbatim), items preserving meaning (gist), or both
presented items and items preserving meaning (verbatim
+ gist) from which familiarity (feeling of oldness) and recol-
lection (remembering defining details about an event) can
be derived from the different DRM item types. For both criti-
cal lures and related distractors recollection increased
between 7 and 14 years (also termed “phantom recollec-
tion”) (Brainerd et al., 2004). For critical lures, familiarity
did not increase between 7 and 14 years whereas it did
for related distractors (Brainerd et al., 2004, Experiment 1;
see also Odegard et al., 2008). Thus, whereas critical lures
are increasingly recollected with increasing age they are
not increasingly familiar. Consequently, they are more
difficult to monitor at output in adults compared to chil-
dren. It may also speak to the notion that these types of
adults’ false memories may be generated during encoding
rather than during retrieval (Jou, 2008; Jou & Flores, 2013)
and are therefore hard to avoid at output.
For true memories, free reporting did increase accuracy
for adults and 10-year-olds consistent with previous episo-
dic tasks that used a non-semantic context (Hollins &
Weber, 2017; Koriat et al., 2001; Krebs & Roebers, 2010;
Perfect & Weber, 2012; Roebers et al., 2009). In contrast,
7-year-olds did not increase their accuracy for presented
items when given the opportunity to skip a response. As
they were able to increase their accuracy across all other
item types it is not a result of an inability to monitor per
se. Rather, this finding may reflect that monitoring abilities
are still rudimentary across contexts as this is the age
range when they develop.
It is important to note that in our version children and
adults were given the “highest” possible incentive to skip a
response (win all, lose all) and the level of incentive given
has impact on memory accuracy as previously shown, that
is, higher incentive leading to more memory accuracy
(Koriat et al., 2001). Therefore, in our paradigm, motivation
to skip and accuracy monitoring are conflated and we are
not directly able to disentangle the two. What is crucial
though, is that participants had the same incentive to
skip an item across all four item types, and yet, there
were differences in the ability to monitor them at retrieval.
This indicates that our results are not purely an artefact of
motivation to skip but do indeed provide insight into accu-
racy monitoring across age in DRM items at retrieval.
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Additionally, there were differences in the proportion of
items that was skipped. Both 7- and 10-year-olds were less
likely to withhold an answer than adults. It is unlikely that
their reduced skipping is due to a lack of understanding
the instructions: First, they only proceeded with the recog-
nition phase once they successfully explained their instruc-
tions. Second, 4- and 5-year-olds can already make
adequate decisions to disclose an answer after giving
confidence judgements about their memory (Hembacher
& Ghetti, 2014) and are more likely to withhold an
answer when uncertain and are more accurate (Lyons &
Ghetti, 2013). Moreover, 5-year-olds have metacognitive
insight into what constitutes a false memory (“I think he
really thought he saw it”) and a guess (Jaswal & Dodson,
2009). Third, and most importantly, they were able to with-
hold answers when given the opportunity to skip to
increase their memory accuracy. Thus, even though chil-
dren and adults differ in howmuch they withheld, children
are able to withhold information at output to increase
accuracy. Moreover, adults who skip more are not univer-
sally more successful in monitoring as shown by the
reverse age pattern for critical lures.
Finally, it isworthnoting that the level of encoding (shallow
versus standard) affected the probability of information being
skipped, that is, more skipping took place in the standard con-
dition, whilst having no effect on accuracy. This is in line with
previous research with adults showing that encoding level
affects adults’willingness to report an answer but leave accu-
racy unaffected (Arnold & Prike, 2015), suggesting the two are
dissociated in both adults and children.
In sum, we report novel findings on children’s and adults’
metacognitive monitoring of DRM false memories at retrie-
val. Children, but not adults, show benefits of withholding
information to improve memory accuracy for DRM false
memories at retrieval. Thus, once semantic false memories
have been encoded children but not adults can strategically
monitor them at retrieval by withholding an answer.
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Appendix
All DRM study lists/items were obtained from Roediger et al. (2001)
and were chosen according to their high backward associative
strength (BAS) to the critical lure and their high word frequency
values using the word frequency norms of British primary school
aged children’s printed vocabulary (Stuart et al., 1993–1996).
Critical lure: Bread Critical lure: Doctor Critical lure: Lion
1. Rye 1. Physician 1. Roar
2. Loaf 2. Nurse 3. Tiger
4. Toast 4. Surgeon 4. Mane
5. Dough 5. Patient 5. Fierce
6. Crust 6. Clinic 6. Den
7. Flour 7. Dentist 7. Cub
8. Sandwich 8. Medicine 8. Cage
9. Jam 9. Lawyer 9. Jungle
10. Jelly 10. Health 10. Bears
11. Slice 11. Sick 11. Pride
12. Milk 12. Cure 12. Africa
13. Food 13. Hospital 13. Circus
14. Eat 14. Office 14. Hunt
15. Wine 15. Ill 15. Feline
Critical lure: Sleep Critical lure: Fruit Critical lure: Hot
1. Nap 1. Kiwi 1. Hot
2. Doze 2. Citrus 2. Shiver
3. Bed 3. Pear 3. Arctic
4. Awake 4. Berry 4. Frigid
5. Drowsy 5. Vegetable 5. Freeze
6. Snooze 6. Banana 6. Chilly
7. Slumber 7. Orange 7. Frost
8. Tired 8. Cherry 8. Warm
9. Rest 9. Apple 9. Ice
10. Snore 10. Ripe 10. Winter
11. Wake 11. Basket 11. Snow
12. Dream 12. Juice 12. Heat
13. Yawn 13. Bowl 13. Wet
14. Blanket 14. Salad 14. Weather
15. Peace 15. Cocktail 15. Air
Recognition Words:
Critical lures:
Bread, Cold, Doctor, Fruit, Lion, Sleep,
Presented items:
Rye, Dough, Milk, Hot, Freeze, Heat, Physician, Patient, Cure, Kiwi,
Vegetable, Juice, Roar, Fierce, Africa, Nap, Drowsy, Dream,
Related distractors:
Meat, Water, Help, Nut, Safari, Relax,
Non-related distractors
Sport, Beautiful, Black, Car, High, King
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